Contemporary Security Challenges: Is Classical Deterrence an Adequate Response?

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INTRODUCTION

As has always been the case on every New Year's Eve, many people wished that new millennium would bring peace, stability and security to the world. Yet, one of the most tragic events in history took place soon after. The attacks of September 11, 2001 heralded the beginning of a new era -no matter how contested this view may be- where the classical approaches to security challenges and the responses thereof are being frequently called into question by security analysts and academics ever since. There is, therefore, an obvious need to revisit the concept of classical deterrence with a view to finding out its limitations as well as to propose adequate responses to the emerging threats posed by a number of new actors in the international arena to the security of many nations worldwide.

After a series of thrilling developments over the last several decades, such as the Cuban missile crisis of the 1960s, the Arab-Israeli conflicts of the 1970s, and the 'star wars' challenges of the 1980s, each of which could well have ended up in an unintentional exchange of thermonuclear weapons between the superpowers, the age of bipolarity in world politics has finally come to an end with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact that was followed by the demise of the Soviet Union.[1] The end of the Cold War has created an enormous sense of relief regarding the threat of nuclear catastrophe. However, the realization of the threat of worldwide proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles as their delivery vehicles, soon after eradicated most hopes for a more stable and peaceful

world order. Unlike the Cold War period during which the threat of nuclear annihilation was menacing but stability could be maintained thanks to the virtues of nuclear deterrence, the post-Cold War era is characterized by highly destabilizing factors such as the emergence of non-state actors (i.e., terrorist organizations, militia groups, cults etc.) as well as states with unrelenting determination to acquire all sorts of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles.[2]

To date, non-state actors have not been successful to stage attacks in which WMD are involved, with the exception of the Tokyo subway attack in March 1995 where sarin gas was used, causing a dozen fatalities and thousands of injuries. But, there is no guarantee that such a devastating attack may not or will not occur any time soon. Trying to make any meaningful estimate about the timing, location or the degree of an attack would be no different than playing the role of a future teller. Because, there are very few parameters or indicators according to which one would base his/her analysis about the likelihood of future attacks. Unlike states whose capabilities are visible to a great extent and disseminate some intelligence, accidentally or on purpose, about their intentions to resort to force within a foreseeable time frame, for instance, by conducting unusually large scale military maneuvers, non-state actors are almost invisible that make it hard to track with their capabilities, let alone to detect their intentions about when and where they are going to stage their next assaults. There is, therefore, no confidence interval, in today's global security structure, within the margins of which one may feel relatively safer against actual or potential adversaries. Moreover, the entire globe has virtually become a battleground where a group of states and a number of non-state actors are engaged in fighting each other.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 have clearly demonstrated that even short of any actual use of WMD, non-state actors could inflict an equally, if not more, devastation with their unprecedented tactics and the instruments that they use as weapons. On that particular day, the world has seen the use of civilian aircraft as a substitute for ballistic missiles. In an age where the United States is acknowledged by almost everybody to be the sole global superpower due to its unmatched military capabilities, it would be merely improbable, if not impossible, for any single state, or even a group of states, to dare attempting to cause a similar damage to that country. Because, the response of the US would be to strike back more than in kind, possibly with nuclear weapons, and to wipe the attacking country out of the face of the earth. What we have seen after September 11, however, was only a limited conventional

strike against Afghanistan, due to the "obvious" connection between the terrorists who staged the attacks and the local Taliban government in Kabul. The 'limited' retaliation was mainly because of the innocence of most Afghan people who were oppressed by the Taliban regime and who would have otherwise been the victims of a nuclear second-strike by the US forces. As such, the September 11 attacks have unequivocally shown that, in the absence of a full-fledged *state* as the clearly defined enemy, classical deterrence may have a 'limited' effect against the non-state actors who have malign intentions to attack other nations.

These being said, this chapter aims to discuss whether classical deterrence can still be seen as an adequate response to the challenges posed by non-state actors, especially in the wake of the events of September 11. Hence, the chapter will first of all highlight the fundamental premises of the classical deterrence theory, both conventional and nuclear. Secondly, a discussion on the changing nature of the strategic context in the post-Cold War era, and more importantly in the post-September 11 period, and the contemporary security challenges will follow. Finally, recommendations will be made in order to meet the challenges emanating from the presence of non-state actors as powerful entities in today's international political military arena.

VIRTUES OF CLASSICAL DETERRENCE

During the Cold War period, both the US and the Soviet Union have developed massive nuclear weapons capabilities. Both sides had all the military means to annihilate the other at least a dozen times. But, because of the so-called second-strike capability of the superpowers, even if one of the parties attempted to launch a surprise attack with a view to disarm the other; it would be virtually impossible to accomplish such a goal. Well protected nuclear stockpiles on both sides as well as long-range missiles tipped with multi-megaton-yield nuclear warheads that could reach the enemy's strategic assets -be they military or civilian- rendered the likelihood of war to a mere impossibility. Since it was impossible to fight, the parties had to deter each other. Having seen the effects of the "primitive" nuclear weapons that were detonated on top of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945, and having developed hundreds and even thousands of times more powerful nuclear warheads, the fear of a nuclear catastrophe, therefore, served well the purpose of a perfect deterrent.[3]

Definition of Deterrence

With the 18th century *Enlightenment*, mainly experienced in Europe, fighting war, and hence military tactics and strategy, became subject to a simple calculus. The establishment of regular standing armies and the use of the merits of analytical thinking, based on not only the wisdom of the generals, but also on a host of mathematical formulae, brought the concept of calculated deterrence into the game of war and politics. According to Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian mastermind of strategy, "*war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.*"[4] Implied in this rather simple, but indeed all-encompassing strategic motto is that war is the ultimate phase in resolving differences between the states, prior to which some other means are available to avoid it. That is, deterrence.

Deterrence requires rational thinking, which means the capability of a decision-maker (i.e., actor) to make cost-benefit analysis with respect to the policies suggested. Hence, if the cost of expected damage that will be incurred because of pursuing a certain policy is, in all likelihood, higher than the expected benefits, then a rational actor will most probably refrain from pursuing that policy. He will be deterred. The actor will either make changes to the plan so as to take the necessary measures to minimize the anticipated damage -- or, will wait until such a time when the expected benefits will be worth taking the anticipated risks.

In the words of Colin S. Gray, deterrence was originated from, and exercised in accordance with "*a pragmatic wisdom*" arising from "experience, commonsense, and intuition."[5] Originally, the word deterrence comes from the Latin word "*deterrere*" that means, "to frighten from."[6] However, until now, many specialists and organizations have defined "deterrence" in their own words.[7] John J. Mearsheimer, in his study entitled *Conventional Deterrence* describes plainly deterrence as a way of convincing an adversary not to fulfill a specific action by revealing him the situation in which the expected benefits would not match its potential costs and risks. In this approach, deterrence calls for a rational cost/benefit calculation process for a specific action.[8] Furthermore, Bernard Brodie defines deterrence as attempts to create appropriate "disincentives" to neutralize "the incentives" of the opponent to destroy the defender.[9] These definitions correctly comprise the essential idea in the concept of deterrence, to create a perception in the minds of opponent that the expected benefits from attacking may cause a high cost. Thus, the fear about the consequences of a specific action was the main mechanism manipulated by the concept of deterrence. In

simple form, deterrence is utilization of threats and threat methods to prevent undesired action of an opponent.

Theoretical Aspects of Deterrence

As it is obviously seen in the definition of deterrence, some conditions must exist to talk about an actual practice of deterrence. First, there must be an opponent planning to use of force against a defender. Second, there must be a defender planning to offset the potential act of opponent by exploiting threat methods.[10] Lastly, for the success of deterrence, the opponent must choose not to attack because of the threat posed by the defender.[11] In this context, deterrence requires clarifying both what the opponent must not do and the potential consequences if he does since the success of deterrence is likely to result from the opponent's conclusion to go ahead or not to go ahead. However, it should be noted that even if the *deterrer* or defender is sincere to carry out the deterrent threat, deterrence might still fail because of the opponent's ignorance on the threat.[12] That is, the most critical difficulty is that a defender may confront an opponent anywhere or anytime "who is free to decide, possibly unreasonably and unwisely."[13]

At this point, it will be helpful to focus on two traditional problems of deterrence. One of them is to ensure that opponent gets the threat message and reads it properly.[14] Public statements and some other methods are used to communicate the cost and risk of an action to the targeted opponent. However, the opponent may fail to take or read the threat message rationally and properly because of "cultural barriers to understanding, internal concerns, or emotional strain."[15] In this context, a deterrence policy fails to generate the expected outcomes. That is why, the threat message must be clear and the defender must be sure that the opponent receives the message properly. The second one is the credibility of threat. Application of deterrence policy should contain a form of credibility based on capability, cost, and intentions. That is, the aggressor should understand that the defender has capability to take action. With this act, the cost would be over and above expected benefit from a specific action.[16] If the defender's statements (concerning what he may do to prevent the specific action of the opponent) seem merely suggestion and are expressed in blurred terms then the credibility of threat in particular and deterrence in general will be not persuaded.[17]

As mentioned above, it is clear that deterrence brings into view a psychological relationship among opposing sides. Hence, the emotions, perceptions, and the

calculations of decision-makers are at the center of a deterrence policy.[18] For this reason, a deterrence policy should be based not only on the actual capability and on the willpower of the defender to carry out his commitments, but also on his skill to convey this capability and determination to the opponent. Since, the cautiously coded intentions of defender more frequently fail to make the expected impact on the opponent for the fact that they seem incredible or oblivious to the opponent.[19] In this context, it may seem problematic to find a way for promising or guaranteeing the success of deterrence. Nevertheless, for the defender, actual capability, a record in the accomplishment of promises, clarity, and consistency in the policy statements are some means supposed to enhance deterrence.[20] In addition, it should be noted that the success of deterrence depends also on its timely practice. That is to say, deterrence is one of the other options that can be employed by the political leaders to pursue national interest on international arena. Hence, overconfidence on only deterrence strategies to protect foreign policy interests will lead to erroneous in policy formulation.[21]

Against this background, it is possible to put into words two notions of deterrence in political or military context, namely deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The former includes a threat to inflict destruction upon the civilian population and industry of the opponent in the form of a punitive action. The latter calls for the persuasion of the opponent that he will fail to accomplish its mission on the battlefield, if he goes ahead. While the deterrence by punishment is generally linked with nuclear deterrence, the deterrence by denial is usually associated with conventional deterrence.[22]

In light of aforementioned explanations, and from a realist perspective, it will be correct to say that to work effectively, a deterrence policy should encompass some characteristic in its nature. These are the requirements of deterrence. The first requirement is *capability*. That is, the potential opponent must be convinced that the *deterrer* or defender has the capability to impose a cost exceeding the expected benefit from a specific action. The second requirement is *will*. The deterrer must have the will to carry out its capability if necessary and show this willingness to act in the specific incident. The third requirement is *credibility*. The enemy must be persuaded that deterrer would really take action in specified occasion. The forth requirement is *Rationality*. The actors must be rational to calculate both the intentions of each other

and the costs or benefits of a specific action. A deterrence policy, lacking these requirements, is likely to fail, at least in the theoretical paradigm.[23]

Conventional Deterrence

Before the advent of nuclear weapons, if one said deterrence, it would mean conventional deterrence. That is, conventional forces are the instruments of deterrence policy. Conventional deterrence is directly concerned with the battlefield outcomes. It aims to deny an aggressor accomplishing his battlefield objective by the employment of conventional capabilities.[24] However, even if the studies on conventional deterrence have applied different definitions and key terms, have asked different questions, and have tested different hypotheses, the outcome that came into view has not differentiated. That is, the conventional deterrence frequently fails, even though the potential respond of the defender were "clearly defined, repeatedly publicized, and defensible, and the committed state [gives] every indication of its intention to defend them by force if necessary."[25]

As Mearsheimer states in his study, it is possible to put forth two underlying variables to explain why conventional deterrence sometimes fails or sometimes holds. One of them is the potential cost and risk of the fighting. The second one is the probability of the success in fighting. These variables are important for the opponent to reach a conclusion. For this reason, it will be correct to say that when the cost is low and the probability of success is high then it is more possible that deterrence will fail. In light of historical cases, it is possible to say that occasionally employment of conventional forces failed to deter many opponents. The reason is that the cost in conventional war may be low to be accepted by the decision-makers of the opponent. The cost, in the case of conventional weapons, can be tolerable for the fact that the level of the cost increases gradually since there is not any way to reach a quick victory by the employment of conventional weapons. Hence, conventional war is generally a protracted war. So a country can tolerate the lost by substituting them in a protracted war. In addition, it is very difficult to foresee the potential cost of a conventional war in advance.[26] Mearsheimer presents this reality in his study.[27] The underlying reason is that wars in conventional level can be won or if not, the losing side can frequently and highly survive as Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic did for quite some time.[28] Bernard Brodie reaches the same conclusion by saying "the large numbers of

wars that have occurred in modern times prove that the threat to use force, even what sometimes looked like superior force, has often failed to deter."[29]

Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear weapons are only one of a kind that they have totally affected the military and security strategies in a direction different from the other weapons did.[30] As Bernard Brodie puts forth in his study entitled *Strategy in the Missile Age*, before the advent of nuclear weapons the most striking conventional weapons, namely tanks and aircrafts just gradually took their place in military planning. However, with the advent of nuclear weapons, the revolution in military strategy came rapidly and the past military experiences began to seem problematic to conduct the future. Hence, the theory of deterrence has also been affected from this invention. In Brodie's words, the deterrence has acquired a new value and implication.[31]

As Waltz expresses, the deterrent strategies gain clarity when nuclear warheads remove "the necessity of fighting" and eliminate "the possibility of defending because only a small number of warheads need to reach their targets."[32] In addition, as Colin S. Gray explains, in its essence, nuclear deterrence does not differ from any other kind of deterrence. However, in its "plausible probability of success", it is effective and almost definitely more dependable than conventional deterrence. Since, "it is very difficult for the recipients of nuclear threats to believe that they would walk away with some success from a nuclear war."[33] That is, the actual use of nuclear weapons in a nuclear war against an opponent does not allow him acquire some political benefits without suffering a huge damage in return.

Hence, nuclear deterrence was born with the advent of nuclear weapons and then developed in the Cold War paradigm.[34] Moreover, it originated from the superpower zero-sum game that covered totally the Cold War environment.[35] As McGeorge Bundy clarifies, it resulted from two facts. The first one is that nuclear weapons are different, in terms of destruction power. The second is that the world remained bipolar in terms of nuclear forces. Hence, the "balance of terror" was the most promising option to dissuade each superpower from launching a first-strike one another and from initiating a nuclear war that would cause unacceptable damage on both side.[36] The basis of nuclear deterrence is the reality of the damage that the actual use of these weapons may pose.[37] Therefore, the cost variable that has been important for the success of deterrence gains a new value with nuclear weapons. Since in no case

the cost of using nuclear weapons will be low to be accepted by any opponent. Furthermore, there will no way to compensate the lost since it will occur in a very short period. Hence, the reality of destruction anticipated in a nuclear war is the essence of credibility in nuclear deterrence [38]

As a result, sustaining credibility, the central concern in conventional deterrence, ceases to exist in nuclear deterrence.[39] In this context, bearing in mind again the famous statement by Clausewitz that "*war is merely the continuation of policy by other means*," and that a nuclear war may lead to the annihilation of all civilization in a matter of hours, then rationally the actual use of nuclear weapons in a war to pursue the political objectives seems irrational. That is, the actual use of nuclear weapons goes no political ends or can serve no rational political purpose. Hence, this underlying consideration paved the way to the creation of nuclear deterrence in which nuclear weapons may only justify their own existence.[40]

Bernard Brodie was first to codify the basis of nuclear deterrence. In his study of *The Absolute Weapon*, he emphasized the threatening value of nuclear weapons by declaring that any country would not be so irrational to consider use of nuclear weapons while "opening itself to reprisals in kind."[41] That is, the value of atomic weapons rests not on their actual employment in war (the traditional logic), but rather on the threat of their use to prevent nuclear wars. Without doubt, this can be seen in the famous statement of Brodie, "thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose." Brodie also put forth that the most important requirement to sustain nuclear deterrence was to take every measure to protect a retaliatory force. [42] Thus, the deterrent capability in nuclear level has been the retaliatory capability by means of the secure second-strike forces.[43] In that sense, nuclear deterrence aims to manipulate the opponent's acts by the threat of inflicting nuclear strikes upon its territory.[44] Theoretically, nuclear deterrence may be used to deter both the nuclear attacks and attacks with conventional forces, and chemical or biological weapons. Hence, the "nuclear" specifies the quality of the threat that will possibly be posed by the defender against the opponent.[45]

With these in mind, it would be no exaggeration to say that deterrent effect is one of the significant power dimensions that nuclear weapons possess.[46] The stability of nuclear deterrence was founded on an undeniable reality that a nuclear war could generate an extraordinary devastation for both adversaries.[47] Therefore, nuclear

deterrence brought into the game a sort of threat that was very effective and gave no way to failure. Unambiguously, the credibility of threat was very high. Brodie expresses this by saying, “for the enemy has little reason to doubt that if he strikes us we will try to hit back.”[48]

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY CHALLENGES

With the end of the Cold War the strategic context that had long rested on a delicate nuclear balance has also come to an end.[49] The so-called "rogue states", as well as non-state actors which have developed state-like hierarchical command structures started to become influential actors in the political and military arena. The appearance of these political and quasi-military entities in the center-stage of international politics has broadly disturbed the long-running stability and predictability in the international system, and also threatened the international peace and security. Especially, the break up of the 15 republics that constituted the Soviet Union brought about manifold problems, extending from the political, military and sociological to cultural and religious aspects of life in the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Also equally worth considering, however, was the abolition of strict Soviet control over military installations, be they weapons production facilities or research laboratories. This has been the most serious concern of all to international security analysts in particular because a number of states, as well as non-state entities, have long been known to be in search of ways to acquire and/or develop weapons of mass destruction.

Often cited among these countries were Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea, which were on the record for offering former Soviet scientists a fortune to sell their knowledge to develop indigenous WMD capabilities for them. As a result of the US war on Iraq, and thanks to the radical shift of Colonel Qaddafi who decided to quit all of his country’s programs related with the development of weapons of mass destruction, these two countries are dropped from the list. Yet, numerous attempts in the illicit trafficking of material, technology and knowledge used in the development of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and their delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles continue. Some of these attempts have been foiled by the security forces of various countries, while some others are believed to have been successful.

More importantly, however, beside these states of concern, some non-state actors are also identified as being involved in the illicit trafficking network for

developing WMD capabilities. For instance, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo has a long record of criminal activity, including the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in March 1995.[50] The cult is believed to be composed of a worldwide network of large numbers of scientist and experts working in many fields extending from medicine to engineering and from archaeology to natural sciences. Cult members were arrested during an attempt to buy uranium mines in Australia via the establishment of parent companies in order to conceal their activities, as well as to acquire a seed stock of the deadly Ebola virus under the guise of scholarly cooperation during an academic gathering in the middle of the out break of that disease in Africa.

Similarly, the world media was alerted soon after the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington DC, that another non-state entity, namely Al Qaeda had also established a worldwide network reportedly in some 70 countries with the involvement of thousands of people from almost all strata of the population and with diverse professional backgrounds. The list of such non-state actors is not exhausted and includes clusters of peoples with different objectives, extending from those that uphold religious extremist principles to racist militia groups. What is of common concern to security analysts with respect to such non-state entities is their desire and the ability to gain access to WMD and/or the material used in their production. Should this happen, maintaining peace and stability in the world will become extremely difficult.

Limits of Classical Deterrence

Even though the so-called rogue states are a major case for serious concern because of their ambitions to take the "revenge" from the militarily more powerful and economically and technologically far more advanced countries of the West, the threat that they pose is still considered to be one that the Western countries can accommodate. This is because, in case of an attack by such a state, there would be a number of strategic targets of theirs (i.e., political headquarters, military installations, bases and the like) whose exact co-ordinates would be known to the countries attacked. Hence, they would be capable of striking back with their superior retaliatory forces. In such cases, the major premises of the classical theory of deterrence elaborated in the previous sections are likely to prove successful. For instance, it is widely agreed among security experts that one particular reason why the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein did not attack Israel with chemical or biological weapons during the

Gulf War in 1991, despite being believed to have such a capability, was that he was deterred by the clear threat from the US that he would be attacked with nuclear weapons in return.

However, non-state actors, mostly the products of the 1990s, have steadily evolved in terms of organizational structures and have increased their sophistication in operational capabilities. These peoples may not always have specific headquarters, military bases, or standing armies against which an attacked country can launch retaliatory strikes. In the absence of the original address of the aggressor, the only politically and militarily viable option today seems to be to hold certain countries responsible for giving logistical support to such entities and therefore threaten them with retaliation in kind. This, has been the case in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Then the US held Sudan and Afghanistan responsible for giving support to the terrorists who staged the attack and retaliated by striking with cruise missiles that carried conventional warheads. But, the legitimacy of these counter strikes was discussed in the international arena. In the same vein, some US authorities claimed that, had the attacks on their embassies been carried out by chemical or biological weapons, not to mention nuclear, the response to Sudan and Afghanistan could have been given with nuclear weapons. Any such action, however, would have required well-documented evidence revealing state sponsorship behind the activities of the non-state actors. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the action might be debatable.

Notwithstanding the question of legitimacy, the options become eventually rare as the spectrum of terror and terrorism grows and changes in profile. Unlike a number of terrorist groups in the past, which needed and continue to need state sponsorship to find shelter as well as logistical and financial support, developments in technology and science may soon, if they have not done so already, render such support unnecessary. Individuals with adequate knowledge in a certain scientific fields and with the sufficient level of technological equipment may very well initiate terrorist attacks that may cause massive casualties and material damage beyond one's imagination. The definition of terror and terrorism should be made as broadly as possible without limiting the profile of a terrorist to someone living in the caves over the mountains carrying MK-47 machine guns and explosives. Anybody who would be able to initiate a deliberate attack with malign purposes could be counted as a terrorist or a credible source of serious threat. There are thousands of peoples on earth who

may have access to sensitive scientific knowledge and technology, who, for one reason or another, may one day decide to use such capabilities not for the good of humanity, but rather for devastating the lives of millions. A far-fetched scenario this may be, but the idea of mailing anthrax spores worldwide was seen as almost equally unlikely until recently. These are typical "low probability, high consequences" scenarios, which must be given more serious thoughts in the "new international psyche" after the tragic events of 11 September. What is worrisome is the inability of states to trace those who would be responsible for such attacks. There may or may not be a state behind such "maverick" individuals. Hence, a handful of measures should be available to fight against such initiatives. But options are rare.

Impact of Religious & Cultural Differences

One other danger associated with state-sponsored or individual terrorism is that those who are involved in such activities may have motivations and/or reasoning stemming from their diverse religious, cultural or ethnic backgrounds. Or their attempts may be represented, and even justified in some circles, as being a result of such differences between their belief systems and those of the rest of the world. This being the case, especially in the face of the terrorist attacks on America, the study of international relations will require reviewing its long-established standard level of analysis, namely the *state* level. The interpretation of the tragic events that took place on 11 September is being done mainly on two grounds. First, there are those who analyze the situation at the state level and determine their political disposition with respect to their relations with the United States, while at the same time they condemn terrorism. Second, there are those who perceive the September 11 events as being a result of the clash of civilizations.[51] Or, to put it more simply, they see it as an outcome of a clash between Islam and Christianity as well as Judaism.

Should this be the case, the study of international relations must be shifted from the state level, where the concept of "national interest" is the ultimate determinant of the pace of relations between states and other actors, to the community (ummah) level where the interest of the community (e.g. Muslims all over the world regardless of their national identities) should be taken into consideration. A careful analysis of worldwide reactions to the events of 11 September reveals that not all actors, be they states, statesmen or community leaders, have agreed to analyze these events at state level. On the contrary, especially in the public domain of most Muslim countries, Al

Qaeda and its leading figure, Ossama bin Laden, are viewed as fighting against the Christians and the Jews in order to protect the rights of oppressed Muslims all around the world. They, therefore, don't consider the events as being terrorism, or those who have staged the events as terrorists.

Although the speech of the President George W. Bush at the US Senate in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks in which he appealed to the peoples of the world by saying that "you are either with us or against us" in the fight against terror has since attracted many harsh criticisms, it is not totally unfounded to argue that the world is indeed diametrically divided between those who fight, or at least acknowledge the necessity to fight, against terrorist organizations or the non-states actors that are categorized as such, and those who sympathize with the non-state actors such as Al Qaeda. This division among nations and the absence of unity or similarity of views make the fight against the non-state actors that resort to terror tactics very difficult. The new form of terrorism which has become a global problem should therefore be dealt with by means of cooperation and collaboration at global level with the participation of as many countries as possible.

CONCLUSION

In the first section of this chapter, several concepts have been forwarded such as the need for rational thinking to make proper cost-benefit analysis; convincing an adversary not to fulfill a specific action by revealing the situations in which the expected benefits would not match its potential costs and risks; conveying determination to the opponent and displaying the capability of a credible counterstrike; creating disincentives to neutralize the incentives of the opponents. In the same vein, several arguments are also put forth such as the one that suggests that conventional deterrence sometimes fails especially when the cost of attack by the opponent is low and the probability of success is high. Thinking of deterrence along these lines within the context of contemporary challenges, it becomes quite clear that classical deterrence cannot be effective in stopping the new actors in the international arena from doing what they plan to do. New approaches are needed to prevent these groups of people from fulfilling their objectives, which may possibly cause catastrophic damages to not only the mankind but also to the environment. But, there are a number of difficulties on the way to achieving this goal, some of which seem to be insurmountable.

Unlike the case for the decision-making bodies of the states in the international arena, non-state actors and their devoted members do not make classical rational cost-benefit analysis, nor do they set their objectives to pursue some material gains. They are not interested in separatist or ideological struggle either. The greatest cost being loosing one's life is not at all considered to be a cost or something to fear. On the contrary, it is seen as a gain. That is, they believe that, once they lose their lives by committing a suicidal attack, for instance, they will gain the greatest benefit of all, namely a place in Heaven. Hence, trying to create disincentives to neutralize the incentives of such people is highly likely to fail. On the other hand, bearing in mind the fact that the new actors do not necessarily have specific addresses to retaliate, efforts to convey a message of determination or to display the capability to strike back will make no significant difference either. Moreover, in the absence of a clear cut state as the aggressor, the response, if at all possible, will have to be with conventional weapons, and deterrence will most likely not work for reasons that have been discussed earlier.

Hence, against this background, where classical deterrence is likely to fail in most circumstances, taking measures to be able to preempt against the terrorists as well as to prevent possible attacks gains importance. But, this must be done in such a way that they should be strictly limited to be employed only against non-state actors, not against the states. Preemptive action against states can be an option only in the case of availability of undeniable hard evidence of collaboration between states and no-state actors to stage an attack, which is believed to be eminent. All in all, preemption will be problematic and will have political implications, especially in the case of an attack against states, no matter what the reason may be. Yet, to achieve this goal, all the peace-loving countries in the world should unite their capabilities in the fight against terror coming from anybody, anywhere, anytime, while preserving their disagreements on a host of other issues.

One of the most significant and possibly most effective instruments in the fight against non-state actors is intelligence. Therefore, states being the essential actors in the international political arena should do their utmost to cooperate in the field of gathering and sharing intelligence. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge the deeply rooted difficulties in sharing intelligence among states. It is already very difficult to share intelligence within the states themselves among their national institutions. Yet,

there are some examples, both at the state level and international level, which may be sources of inspiration for further collaborative action in this field.

At the state level, for instance, the United States has embarked upon a large-scale restructuring process of its entire chain of intelligence gathering and sharing. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which is responsible to collect intelligence concerning the capabilities and intentions of other nations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which is responsible for nation-wide intelligence gathering are combining their efforts under the umbrella of a bigger (and probably superior) institution, which is still in the making as of late 2004, within the framework of the US Department of Homeland Security. It is hoped that the flow of intelligence will be faster and more credible, and the relevant US authorities will be better informed in a timely manner about the possible dangers associated with terrorist attacks. As such, it is believed that the chances of prevention of further attacks will be higher. Even though, there has always been such a proposal before the authorities, due to a number of reasons, some of which were trivial such as institutional integrity and the like, no changes took effect so far. The recent restructuring process is said to be the result of the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001.[52]

At the international level, similar ways and means must be found before it is too late, taking into consideration the likely consequences of not cooperating. To achieve such a goal, NATO may be an appropriate venue to gather and share intelligence collectively. There already exists a very sophisticated infrastructure within the North Atlantic Alliance which is expanding both in terms of membership, by way of admitting most of the central and eastern European countries, and also in terms of scope of its mission. NATO is no more an organization concerned with territorial defense against a clearly defined enemy. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been undergoing a comprehensive process of transformation to meet the emerging challenges such as those mentioned above. NATO's command and control structure as well as its planning capabilities are being upgraded steadily.[53] Technological supremacy of NATO is being supplemented with additional elements that are hoped to enable the Alliance to expand its human intelligence (HUMINT) capability, which is more reliable in the fight against the non-state actors. Because, technological superiority does not mean too much, after a certain level, in trying to track with the individuals who are known or suspected to be members of non-state actors.

Bearing in mind such positive developments within the Alliance, more and more countries should be invited to collaborate with NATO countries, either by way of becoming full or associate members or partners. Since the threat posed by world-wide terrorist networks is global, responses should be global as well. Instead of trying to establish institutional structures anew, the existing NATO platform which has a built-in credibility earned over the years should be exploited to the most and its capabilities should be made commensurate with the challenges. The NATO Summit that took place in Istanbul in late June 2004 hinted at the possibility of exchange of information between the existing members of NATO and other nations which have both the capability and the will to collect and share intelligence. There is no guarantee that a nation which is not a target of the non-state actors at present will never be targeted in the future for whatever reason that may make sense only to the members of the terrorist organizations.

The need for better understanding of the reasons and the motivations of those who stage the attacks, as part of the efforts to deal with terrorism is clear. Any effective measure should be utilized to the fullest extent possible to stem further proliferation of terrorist cells all over the world. However, relying only on soft security approaches may not be a remedy. Just like the chicken and egg dilemma, the events taking place in the international arena breed terrorism which invite the use of force by states that further sharpen the stance of the non-state actors and the divide among the states. As such, the spiral effects of the clash between states and non-state actors bring more instability to the world.

During the Cold War, the stakes were high, the threat was imminent, but there was also stability. The key to maintaining peaceful stability during the nuclear age was deterrence, which worked well for decades -until the turn of the millennium. Nevertheless, if the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) marked the end of the Cold War period, the collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center (WTC) marked the resumption of a hot war period. This time, the war is against terrorism. It is not certain as to how long this war will continue, on which fronts, and with the involvement of whom as friends or foes. What is certain, however, is that the war will have serious implications for many countries in the world. Unless recognition of this paradigmatic shift in the nature of international relations is taken more seriously primarily in academia, world will not be a better or safer place to live.

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NOTES & REFERENCES

[1] The Warsaw Pact, or the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), was established on 14 May 1955 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance by the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. It is widely believed that the admittance of West Germany into NATO in May 1955 compelled the eight socialist countries of Eastern Europe to form a military pact against NATO's expansion to the east.

[2] See Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "Turkey's Sweet & Sour Policy Against WMD Proliferation" *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 2004), p. 101.

[3] The plutonium-based nuclear weapon, called "fat man", dropped on Nagasaki yielded energy equivalent to approximately 20 kilotons. This atomic blast was also equivalent to an explosion that could be achieved by bringing together 2,000 trucks each loaded with 10 tons of TNT (dynamite) and blowing them up altogether at the same moment.

[4] See Carl Von Clausewitz's work on the various aspect of the conduct of war translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds.), *On War* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 87.

[5] See Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence in the 21st Century," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Jul-Sep 2000), p. 255.

[6] The New International Webster's Dictionary, (Naples, Fla: Trident Press International, 1995) cited in National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security and Arms Control, *The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy*, (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), p. 13.

[7] For example, the National Academy Report (1997) defines deterrence in narrow sense as "to discourage from action by making the consequences seem frightening," and in broad meaning as "for situations in which the restraint arises simply from the prospect of failure to achieve the intended aims, or the prospect of costs exceeding an action's expected benefits." See, Ibid, p. 13. In addition, the US Department of Defense describes deterrence as "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences," and as "a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." See US Department of Defense*: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint pub. 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 12 April 2001, As Amended Through 23 January 2002), p. 129, available on line at: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

[8] Decision-makers simply evaluate the situation in which the political consequences of not attacking are compared with the cost of military attacking. See John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 13 - 23 and 65.

[9] See Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," *World Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jan. 1959), p. 180.

[10] See Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo", in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein (eds.) *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 36.

[11] See Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Second Edition) (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 38.

[12] See Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 15 - 19.

[13] See Gray, op. cit.

[14] See Freedman, op. cit., pp. 15 - 19.
[15] See Edward Rhodes, "Conventional Deterrence," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Jul-Sep 2000), pp. 221 -233.
[16] See William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence", in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.), *US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989), pp. 171 - 173.
[17] See Freedman, op. cit., pp. 24 - 25.
[18] Robert Jervis, "Introduction: Approaches and Assumptions", in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 1 - 2.
[19] See Richard Ned Lebow, "Conclusions," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) pp. 203-210.
[20] See Gray, op. cit.
[21] See Alexander L. George, and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No, 2 (Jan. 1989), pp. 181 – 182.
[22] See Mearsheimer, op. cit., p.15.
[23] See Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 168 – 173. Also see T. V. Paul, "Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment," in T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), *The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 26
[24] See Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 17.
[25] See Richard Ned Lebow, "Conclusions," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
[26] See Mearsheimer, op. cit., pp. 23 - 24
[27] While the study includes the examples of both deterrence failures and deterrence successes, of the twelve case studies only two cases exemplify exact deterrence success. Ibid, pp. 20 - 21.
[28] See Gray, op. cit.
[29] See Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 272.
[30] See Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 5 - 6.
[31] See Brodie (1965), op. cit., pp. 271 - 272.
[32] See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sept. 1990), p. 732.
[33] See Gray, op. cit.
[34] See Brodie (1965), op. cit., p. 271.
[35] See T. V. Paul, op cit., p. 38.
[36] See McGeorge Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has Changed?" in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.), *US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989), p. 456.
[37] Andre Beaufre, *Deterrence, and Strategy*, translated by R.H. Barry (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 35 cited in Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Forces: The Conceptual Components," *Strategic Analysis,* Vol. 23, No. 7 (October 1999).
[38] See Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 23.
[39] See Waltz, op. cit., p. 734.
[40] See Payne, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
[41] See Barry H. Steiner, *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy* (University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 12.
[42] See Bernard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946) p. 76 cited in Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1978), pp. 65 - 73.
[43] See Waltz, op. cit., p. 737.

[44] See Payne (1996), op. cit., p. 6.
[45] See National Academy Report (1997), op. cit., p. 14.
[46] For details, see T. V. Paul, op. cit., pp. 19-28.
[47] See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 110, No. 2, (Summer 1995), p. 157.
[48] See Brodie (1965), op. cit., pp. 272-273.
[49] It may be more appropriate to use the terminology of the age (i.e. the 1960s) where stability in superpower rivalry was believed to owe much to the existence of a "delicate balance of terror", so labeled after the work of Albert Wohlstetter, who was a leading strategist with the RAND Corporation. See Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.), *US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989), pp. 143 - 167.
[50] The cult's name means "the ultimate truth".
[51] See Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No.3. (Summer 1993), pp. 22 - 28.
[52] For details see *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, Authorized Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, pp. 360 - 428.
[53] For further details see the official web site of NATO: www. nato.int.